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Abstract We study a model where economic growth is fueled by public basic-research
investment and the importation of leading technology from foreign countries. In each period,
the government chooses the amount of basic research, balancing the costs and benefits of
stimulating growth through both channels. We establish the existence of steady states and
the long-run share of technologically advanced sectors in the economy. Then we explore
how different degrees of openness affect long-term incentives to invest in basic research. Our
main insight is that higher openness tends to encourage more investment in basic research,
which, in turn, yields a larger share of leading sectors. If, however, there are prospects of
importing major technology advances, highly open countries will reduce basic research as
such imports become particularly valuable.
Keywords Basic research · Openness · Economic growth
JEL Classification O31 · O38
1 Introduction
Policy-makers in industrialized countries often face subtle tradeoffs when they try to foster
economic growth. For instance, should a country foster domestic innovations by investing
in basic research, or should it rely on potential market entry by foreign firms with superior
technology? This is the question addressed in this paper.
We develop a model in which government investments that take the form of employ-
ing skilled labor for basic research can foster the innovation success of domestic firms.
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Successful domestic firms are able to produce as monopolists at the technological frontier
for a certain time and may drive foreign firms out of the market. In sectors where domestic
firms fail to innovate, foreign firms may enter with leading technology. The likelihood of this
event depends on the degree of openness.
In such a model, higher investment in basic research for a particular generation has three
effects on the economy. First, basic research draws skilled labor from the production sec-
tor, thereby making skilled labor more costly and reducing consumption. Second, as basic
research fosters innovation, it has a positive effect on the productivity and consumption level
of the economy. And third, by increasing innovation success basic research also helps to
prevent foreign entry, thereby raising innovation rents and income.
Our results are twofold. First, we establish the circumstances under which the economy
converges to a steady state with a particular share of leading industries. In the long run,
economies typically either exhibit a constant share of technologically advanced sectors or
they converge to polar cases with only leading sectors or none at all.
Second, we examine how changes in the degree of openness affect the optimal level of
basic research in the steady states and whether changes in openness foster a country’s con-
vergence towards the world’s technological frontier. We show that for small and intermediate
innovation steps, an increase in openness induces higher investments in basic research which,
in turn, yields a higher share of leading sectors in the economy in the long run. The reason
is that the benefits of foreign entry arising from the importation of leading technology are
smaller than the costs of foreign entry in terms of the domestic firm’s profit losses. However,
if innovation steps are large, implying that the technological progress induced by foreign
entry is large, we observe the opposite relationship.
Our paper is related to theoretical literature that incorporates basic research into R&D-
driven growth models (e.g. Arnold 1997; Cozzi and Galli 2009, 2011a,b; Gersbach et al.
2009). Most of these contributions focus on the optimal level of basic research in closed
economies. There are two papers that also investigate the impact of openness. In a two-coun-
try model, Park (1998) analyzes how cross-country knowledge spillovers affect the optimal
level of public basic research, whereas the degree of openness determines how large the
spillovers are. Our notion of openness differs, as we focus on market entry by foreign firms.
Gersbach et al. (2010) study how openness affects the interplay between basic and applied
research in a static model. Our paper shows that, in the long run, the correlation between
the degree of openness and basic-research investments is positive for moderate technology
advances but may be reversed for large technology advances.
Our paper is structured as follows: In the next section we present empirical observations
supporting our central model assumptions concerning basic research provision and its impact
on private R&D. In Sect. 3 we present the model. Section 4 is a discussion of the effects of
basic research. In Sect. 5 we explore the dynamics of the model, derive the steady states, and
characterize their properties, followed by an analysis on the impact of openness in Sect. 6.
In Sect. 7 we explore extensions of the basic model and then provide empirical support for
our main theoretical findings in Sect. 8. Section 9 concludes.
2 Empirical observations
In this section we motivate our assumptions that basic research is largely publically financed
and increases the productivity of private R&D by several empirical observations.
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Table 1 R&D expenditures
Gross domestic
expenditures on R&D as a
percentage of GDP
Basic research
expenditures as a
percentage of total
R&D expenditures
Applied research
expenditures as a
percentage of total
R&D expendituresa
2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009
Argentina 0.44 0.51b 27.75 29.32b 72.25 70.68b
Australia 1.47 2.24c 25.81 20.03c 74.19 79.97c
China 0.90 1.70 5.22 4.66 94.78 95.34
Czech Republic 1.17 1.48 23.34 27.10 76.66 72.90
France 2.15 2.26 23.60 26.01 76.40 73.99
Hungary 0.81 1.17 24.24 20.62 75.76 79.38
Ireland 1.09d 1.74 15.84d 23.16 84.16d 76.84
Israel 4.27 4.46 17.16 13.69 82.84 86.31
Japan 3.04 3.36 12.38 12.46 87.62 87.54
Korea 2.30 3.56 12.61 18.06 87.39 81.94
Portugal 0.73 1.64 22.85 18.93 77.15 81.07
Singapore 1.85 2.27 11.75 20.28 88.25 79.72
Slovak Republic 0.65 0.48 22.77 40.80 77.23 59.20
Switzerland 2.53 2.99c 27.96 26.78c 72.04 73.22c
United States 2.71 2.90 15.95 18.92 84.05 81.08
Average 1.74 2.18 19.28 21.39 80.72 78.61
Source: own calculations based on OECD (2012), Main Science and Technology Indicators
The data has been downloaded in April 2012
a The OECD categorizes R&D into “basic research”, “applied research”, “experimental development” and
“not elsewhere classified”. We summarize the last three items under “applied research”
b Data from 2007
c Data from 2008
d Data from 2002
2.1 Basic and applied research expenditures
Basic and applied research expenditures are significant in most industrialized and industrial-
izing countries. As displayed in Table 1, in 2009 the average ratio of total R&D expenditures
to GDP in a sample of countries with comparable data was 2.18 %. Besides Israel, R&D
expenditures are highest in the Asian countries Korea and Japan. On average, basic research
expenditures amount to 21.39 % of total R&D expenditures in 2009. Several smaller countries
display higher shares than major industrial countries (US, France or Japan), while China has
the lowest share. The average share of basic research expenditures in total R&D expenditures
increased from 19.28 % in 2000 to 21.39 % in 2009.
2.2 Modes of performance and financing
Table 2 illustrates that basic research is mainly performed in the public sector, while applied
research is carried out mainly by the private sector. This table displays where basic and applied
research in 2009 is carried out, broken down into government and higher education institu-
tions, business enterprises, as well as private non-profit institutions. Table 2 indicates that
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Table 2 Basic and applied research by sector of performance in 2009
Basic research performing shares
(% of total basic research expenditures)
Applied research performing shares (% of
total applied research expenditures)a
Government
and higher
education
Business
enterprise
Private
non-profit
Government
and higher
education
Business
enterprise
Private
non-profit
Argentina 95.21b 2.48b 2.31b 56.36b 41.91b 1.73b
Australia 77.45c 16.89c 5.66c 25.64c 72.47c 1.89c
China 98.37 1.63 0.00 23.28 76.72 0.00
Czech Republic 90.02 9.65 0.33 17.25 82.19 0.57
France 83.51 14.45 2.05 20.77 78.32 0.90
Hungary 87.63 12.37 0.00 28.26 71.74 0.00
Ireland 81.30 18.70 0.00 18.80 81.20 0.00
Israel 67.22 27.32 5.46 8.67 88.54 2.79
Japan 56.89 40.62 2.50 17.75 80.76 1.49
Korea 42.26 56.64 1.10 20.10 78.14 1.75
Portugal 75.71 3.63 20.66 35.06 59.32 5.63
Singapore 67.51 32.49 0.00 30.95 69.05 0.00
Slovak Republic 97.86 2.09 0.04 25.03 74.92 0.05
Switzerland 71.59c 23.71c 4.70c 7.83c 91.71c 0.46c
United States 68.34 19.46 12.20 14.98 82.47 2.55
Average 77.39 18.81 3.80 23.38 75.30 1.32
Source: own calculations based on OECD (2012)
The data has been downloaded in April 2012
a As in Table 1 we summarize the OECD’s notions of “applied research”, “experimental development” and
“not elsewhere classified” under “applied research”
b Data from 2007
c Data from 2008
on average 77.39 % of basic research expenditures were performed by the government and
higher education institutions, while business enterprises and private non-profit institutions
accounted for 18.81 and 3.80 %, respectively. Almost the reverse pattern holds for applied
research. On average government and higher education institutions performed 23.38 % of
applied research, while the dominant part of 76.62 % is carried out by private institutions
(mainly business enterprises). We further know from own calculations based on OECD (2012)
that approximately 80 % of R&D performed in the higher-education and government sector
is publicly funded.1 Since basic research is mainly performed in this sector, we can conclude
that basic research is primarily funded publicly.
2.3 R&D productivity enhancing basic research
Basic research impacts applied research through a variety of channels (see e.g. Amon 2011):
open science (publications, scientific reports, conferences), “embodied knowledge transfer”
associated with scientists moving from basic to applied research, collaborative and contracted
research ventures, informal interaction between basic and applied researchers, joint industry-
1 The data has been downloaded in May 2012.
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university research centers, academic consulting, the patenting and licensing of university
inventions, or through the creation of new firms as start-ups and spin-offs from universities.
Various studies have shown that basic research has a positive impact on applied research.
For instance Nelson (1986, 2012); Jaffe (1989), Adams (1990); Acs et al. (1992), or
Mansfield (1991, 1995, 1998) find a significant and positive impact of academic research on
innovative activity and success across various industries. Likewise, Grilliches (1986) iden-
tifies that basic research is the most important productivity-growth enhancing component of
total R&D. Furthermore, Acs et al. (1994) and Link and Rees (1990) find that, in particular,
small firms benefit relatively strongly from university research. We will therefore model basic
research as investments by the government that enhance the productivity of private R&D.
3 The model
Our model stands in the tradition of growth models with quality-improving innovations
(Aghion and Howitt 1992). We consider a dynamic set-up with discrete time periods, t =
0, 1, 2, . . .. There is a continuum with measure 1 + L¯ of households, each living for one
period, enjoying strictly increasing utility in consumption, and receiving an equal share of
the intermediate firms’ profits. A measure 1 of the households inelastically supplies one unit
of unskilled labor, and a measure L¯ of the households supplies skilled labor. Unskilled labor
is used in final good production only, while skilled labor is necessary in intermediate good
production and basic-research activities. There is no population growth. In each period, a
government representing the current generation maximizes the well-being of its citizens by
publicly providing basic research financed by an income tax.2 We first describe the produc-
tion side of the economy in a typical period and then proceed to solve the government’s
optimization problem. In general, we omit the time index t , as long as there is no possibility
of confusion.
3.1 Final-good sector
In the final-good sector, a continuum of competitive firms produces the homogeneous con-
sumption good y according to
y = L1−αu
1∫
0
(A(i)x(i))α di. (1)
x(i) stands for the amount of intermediate input of variety i, A(i) is this variety’s produc-
tivity factor, and Lu denotes the amount of unskilled labor. The parameter α determines the
output elasticity of the intermediate goods or the level of technology. The price of the final
consumption good is normalized to one. In the following, we operate with one representative
final-good firm that acts competitively. The final-good producer maximizes profits πy
max
{x(i)}1i=0,Lu
⎧⎨
⎩πy = y −
1∫
0
p(i)x(i) di − wu Lu
⎫⎬
⎭ ,
2 Essentially, we have a non-overlapping generations model in which each generation elects a government to
provide public goods (here basic research) to maximize its well-being. This is equivalent to maximizing the
consumption of the current generation.
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where p(i) is the price of good i and wu denotes the wage rate of unskilled labor. The
maximization yields the inverse demand for unskilled labor
wu = (1 − α)L−αu
1∫
0
(A(i)x(i))α di. (2)
As unskilled labor is only used in final-good production and its supply is fixed at measure 1,
we obtain wu = (1 − α)y for the aggregate labor income of unskilled labor. Further, using
that the market for unskilled labor clears and thus Lu = 1, we obtain the inverse demand
functions for intermediate goods i as
p(i) = αA(i)αx(i)α−1.
We note that the profit of the final-good producer is zero.
3.2 Intermediate-goods sectors
Intermediate goods i are produced by skilled labor Lx (i) only, using a linear technology:
x(i) = Lx (i). (3)
Each variety i is produced by an intermediate firm. An intermediate-goods firm acts com-
petitively in the market for skilled labor and is a monopolist in its intermediate sector. Profits
are given by p(i)x(i)−wx(i), where w denotes the wage level for skilled labor. Accordingly,
the monopolistic intermediate firm asks a price p(i) = w
α
for its goods, leading to a skilled
labor demand of
Lx (i) =
(
α2 A(i)α
w
) 11−α
= x(i) (4)
and profits
πx (i) = (1 − α)
(
α1+α A(i)α
wα
) 11−α
. (5)
3.3 Technological state, innovation, and foreign entry
We follow Aghion et al. (2009) and assume that there is a world technological frontier which
in period t is given by A¯t and grows exogenously over time in accordance with
A¯t = γ˜ A¯t−1,
where A¯t−1 denotes the technological frontier of the preceding period and γ˜ > 1. In order
to simplify the exposition and the notation, we use γ := γ˜ α1−α in the remainder of the paper,
which yields A¯t = γ 1−αα A¯t−1.
We assume that each intermediate sector comprises a single domestic firm. At the end of
the preceding period, each domestic intermediate firm can be of two types:
Type 1 The firm’s technology is on a par with the current technological frontier, At−1(i) =
A¯t−1.
Type 2 The firm’s technology lags one step behind the current technological frontier,
At−1(i) = A¯t−2.
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An intermediate firm innovates with a certain probability. An innovation by a type 1 firm
increases the firm’s technology level by a factor γ
1−α
α , thus enabling it to retain its position
at the technological frontier. Additionally, an innovation by a lagging type 2 firm can enable
the firm to leapfrog to the technology frontier.
The government can foster the innovation opportunities of domestic firms by investing in
basic research. We specify the probabilities of type 1 and type 2 firms innovating successfully
as
ρ1(L B) = min {θ L B , 1} , (6)
ρ2(L B) = min {ηθ L B , 1} , (7)
where θ > 0 and 0 < η < 1 are parameters that capture the efficiency of basic research with
respect to a type 1 firm and leapfrogging by a type 2 firm, respectively. L B denotes the amount
of skilled labor in the basic-research sector financed by the government. Equations (6) and
(7) specify that basic research constitutes a public good from which domestic intermediate
firms can benefit. Throughout the paper, we assume that L B ≤ 1θ . This assumption enables
us to ignore the kinks in (6) and (7) and to write ρ1(L B) = θ L B and ρ2(L B) = ηθ L B . As
more investments in basic research than 1
θ
cannot increase the innovation success of type 1
firms, this assumption is not very restrictive and substantially simplifies the exposition.
In this paper, we focus on the impact of basic research on innovation activities by firms
and do not explicitly model applied research activities by firms. Hence probabilities ρ1(L B)
and ρ2(L B) must be interpreted as the differential impact basic research has on the success
of private firms’ innovations. For simplicity, we normalize the probability of success to zero
if no basic-research capacities are provided by the government.3
A type 2 firm that does not innovate successfully has the option of adopting the mature
technology, i.e. the technological level that lags one step behind frontier technology. In our
model, a type 2 firm currently holding a monopoly position and being unsuccessful in leap-
frogging will find it profitable to adopt the next technology. Adopting the next technology
will enable a type 2 firm to maintain its monopoly position unless—as we will see subse-
quently—a foreign firm with a superior technology enters the market.4
Openness is introduced in the following way:
• If the domestic firm lags behind the technological frontier, a foreign firm will enter with
probability σ , will introduce the leading technology into the domestic market and will
capture the entire market in this sector.
• If the domestic firm produces at the technological frontier, no foreign entry will occur in
the respective sector.
Two interpretations of this concept of openness are provided in Appendix B. The property
that firms headquartered in a foreign country have superior technology if they manage to
enter the domestic market reflects a common finding in the empirical literature indicating
that foreign direct investment by leading-edge companies is a powerful mechanism for rais-
ing productivity in host countries (e.g Baily and Gersbach 1995; Keller and Yeaple 2009, or
3 The qualitative results remain unchanged if we employ ρ1 = min {θ L B + ρA, 1} and ρ2 =
min {ηθ L B + ρA, 1} with ρA being the innovation chances of private firms if there is no basic research. A
more detailed discussion on how to endogenize private, applied R&D can be found in Sect. 7.3 and Appendix
D.
4 This behavior is often justified by small but positive adoption costs. Such costs prevent potential competitors
from investing in technology adoption, as the costs could not be recovered in the ensuing price competition in
the specific intermediate sector. We neglect these costs in the analysis. If they were substantial, basic research
might have further beneficial effects, as it can lower the costs of adopting mature technologies for domestic
firms.
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Alfaro et al. 2010). FDI contributes directly to higher levels of productivity by transferring
the best production techniques to the host country and indirectly by putting pressure on the
host country’s domestic producers to improve.5
We note that a higher degree of openness in our paper implies a higher probability that
leading technology is brought in by foreign firms, but it has no effect on the domestic firms’
ability to adopt technology from the world technology frontier. This reflects the idea that
new technological products require specific knowledge to be produced. This knowledge is
brought in by foreign firms as the empirical literature above indicates. In Sect. 7.5, we discuss
how our model can be extended to a concept of openness that additionally includes direct
technological spillovers to domestic firms.
In sum, each intermediate sector is in one of three states at the beginning of a particular
period:
State 1 Type 1 firm holding a monopoly
State 2 Type 2 firm holding a monopoly
State f Foreign firm with frontier technology holding a monopoly
We denote the fractions of the states in period t by s1,t (state 1), s2,t (state 2), and s f,t (state
f), where for all t, s1,t , s2,t , s f,t ≥ 0 and s1,t + s2,t + s f,t = 1.
The way the sector states evolve depends on domestic innovation and foreign entry. If the
domestic firms in sectors of state 1 or 2 innovate successfully, they will remain in state 1 or
move up to state 1, respectively. If those firms fail to innovate, a foreign firm will enter and
take over those sectors with probability σ . Thus, unsuccessful domestic firms achieve state
2 with the complementary probability (1 − σ).
If a sector is in state f at the beginning of a particular period, it is possible for the domestic
laggard to leapfrog and regain the monopoly position by innovating successfully.6 If there
is no domestic innovation in the sector, the sector will remain occupied by a foreign firm,
given that an innovating foreign firm will find it optimal to introduce the new technology
with probability σ . This may either be the firm that has already occupied the domestic sector
if it is able to keep up with the technological frontier or a new foreign firm replacing the old.
Hence, with the complementary probability (1−σ) the sector is handed back to the domestic
laggard.7
3.4 Summary: sequences of events and sector dynamics
It is useful at this point to summarize the model’s timing of events and sector dynamics. In
each sector there is one domestic firm that conducts research with success probability ρ1(L B)
if it is currently operating at the technological frontier and ρ2(L B) if it is lagging behind or
the respective sector is occupied by a foreign firm. In each period the following sequence of
events occurs:
1. Government chooses basic research
2. Domestic firms conduct R&D
3. Technological frontier increases to A¯t = γ 1−αα A¯t−1
5 The most prominent examples are the US transplants of automotive companies headquartered in Japan.
6 An alternative way of motivating how domestic firms can drive the foreign firm out of the market is to think
of spin-offs. There are several empirical studies (e.g. Bania et al. (1993) and Zucker et al. (1998)) that provide
evidence that basic research has a positive effect on the creation of new firms. So the innovation probability
of type 2 firms could also be understood as the spin-off probability of domestic high-tech firms.
7 An interpretation of this behavior can be found in Appendix B.
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4. Domestic firms with technology level A¯t−2 failing to innovate and catch-up to frontier
level A¯t adopt a mature technology at the level A¯t−1
5. Foreign firms decide whether to enter (or keep on operating in) the domestic market
6. Production of consumption good
The following remark is in order here. Due to their public-good characteristics, investments
in basic research constitute aggregate expenditures and benefit all sectors. As an individual
firm in one sector cannot generate aggregate profits in the continuum of sectors, it will not
be able to produce a positive amount of basic research itself.
In Appendix C we provide an alternative micro-foundation of our set-up with multiple
domestic firms and patent races.8 The following scheme illustrates the sector dynamics within
a period:
s1,t−1 −→
⎧⎨
⎩
ρ1 : s1,t
(1 − ρ1)σ : s f,t
(1 − ρ1)(1 − σ) : s2,t
s2,t−1 −→
⎧⎨
⎩
ρ2 : s1,t
(1 − ρ2)σ : s f,t
(1 − ρ2)(1 − σ) : s2,t
s f,t−1 −→
⎧⎨
⎩
ρ2 : s1,t
(1 − ρ2)σ : s f,t
(1 − ρ2)(1 − σ) : s2,t
Accordingly, we obtain the following equations of motion for the country’s industry structure:
s1,t =s1,t−1θ L B + (1 − s1,t−1)ηθ L B , (8)
s2,t =(1 − σ)
[
(1 − θ L B)s1,t−1 + (1 − ηθ L B)(1 − s1,t−1)
]
, (9)
s f,t =σ
[
(1 − θ L B)s1,t−1 + (1 − ηθ L B)(1 − s1,t−1)
]
. (10)
3.5 Equilibrium
The economy comprises the market for the final consumption good with price unity, the
market for skilled labor with wage rate w, the market for unskilled labor with wage rate
wu , and a continuum of intermediate-goods markets with prices p(i) = wα . As unskilled
labor is only used in final-good production and has a fixed supply of measure 1, the wage
rate wu is defined as in Sect. 3.1. In the skilled labor market, labor L¯ is supplied inelastical-
ly. Demand for skilled workers consists of the government’s demand for basic researchers
and the demand for skilled workers in intermediate-goods production. Hence the market for
skilled labor clears when
8 Another reasonable assumption would be that the laggard type 2 sectors are perfectly competitive because
all firms can adopt the lagging technology level for free. Changing the model set-up in this direction poses no
problems. It is slightly less convenient with respect to the mathematical calculations and adds one additional
effect: the Monopoly Distortion Effect. If a type 1 firm is not successful in its innovation project to keep up
with the technological frontier, the sector will become perfectly competitive, and consequently the monop-
oly distortion will vanish. Hence, in contrast to our standard formulation, basic research not only promotes
productivity gains but also monopoly distortions. As a consequence, the incentive to invest in basic research
would be lower.
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L¯ = L B +
1∫
0
Lx (i) di. (11)
The demand for skilled workers in intermediate-goods production depends on the sector’s
technological level after innovation activities and foreign entry have occurred. This reflects
our assumption that foreign intermediate firms bring leading technology with them from
abroad but produce the intermediate goods within the country. Consequently, the total inter-
mediates’ demand for skilled production workers is given by
1∫
0
Lx (i) di =
(
s1,t + s f,t
)
L1,x + s2,t L2,x . (12)
The variable L1,x denotes the skilled labor demand in a technologically leading sector with
the technology level A¯t and L2,x the skilled labor demand in a technologically lagging sector
with the technology level A¯t−1 given by Eq. (4). Using Eq. (4), we can rewrite (12) as
1∫
0
Lx (i) di =
(
α2 A¯αt
w
) 11−α
χ(L B), where (13)
χ(L B) =s1,t + s f,t + s2,t 1
γ
. (14)
Note that according to the system dynamics given in (8)–(10), χ(L B) is a linear function of
L B . Therefore it is convenient to define χ(L B) = χ ′L B + χ¯ . Inserting (13) into (11) we
obtain the equilibrium wage for skilled labor for a given level of basic research:
w(L B) = α2 A¯αt
[
χ(L B)
L¯ − L B
]1−α
. (15)
An increase in basic research has two effects on the wage level for skilled labor. First, a
higher technological level increases the productivity of the respective intermediates and con-
sequently enhances demand. This leads to a wage increase. Second, by reducing the supply
of skilled labor for intermediate good production, a rise in L B also increases the wage level.
The following lemma formalizes the effect of basic research on the equilibrium wage for
skilled labor:
Lemma 1 d w(L B )d L B > 0.
Proof See Appendix A.1.
From the equilibrium wage for skilled labor we obtain the equilibrium prices for intermedi-
ate goods, from which the quantities, the firms’ profits, and the wage for unskilled labor in
equilibrium follow. To simplify notation, we will henceforth use w to denote the equilibrium
wage for skilled labor associated with a particular level of basic research.
3.6 Government
In each period, the government chooses the amount of basic-research labor L B(L B < L¯)
required to maximize aggregate consumption c by the current generation. The expenditures
wL B are financed by a tax τ ∈ [0, 1] on household income. Households earn wages and obtain
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profits from domestic intermediate-goods production. Consequently, the budget constraint
for the government reads
wL B = τ
(
w L¯ + wu + s1,tπ1,x + s2,tπ2,x
)
, (16)
where π1,x and π2,x represent the profits of a technologically leading firm and that of a
technologically lagging firm, respectively. Aggregate domestic consumption c equals total
income after taxes:
c = (1 − τ) (w L¯ + wu + s1,tπ1,x + s2,tπ2,x) . (17)
By using the aggregate income identity, the government’s problem can also be written as
max
L B
{c = y − s f,tπ1,x }
=
(
α2 A¯t
w
) α1−α [
s1,t + s2,t 1
γ
+ s f,t (1 − α(1 − α))
]
. (18)
Let us define
ζ(L B) = s1,t + s2,t 1
γ
+ s f,t (1 − α(1 − α)). (19)
The government’s objective can now be written as c =
(
α2 A¯t
w
) α
1−α
ζ(L B). As we know
from the equations of motion (8)–(10) that ζ(L B) is a linear function of L B , we can define
ζ(L B) = ζ ′L B + ζ¯ . The following proposition gives the solution to the government’s opti-
mization problem:
Proposition 1 The unique solution to the government’s maximization problem is given by
L B = min
{
L+B ,
1
θ
}
, if L+B ∈ R and L+B ≥ 0,
L B =0, else,
where
L+B =
1 − α
2
L¯ − 1 + α
2
χˆ +
√(
1 − α
2
L¯ − 1 + α
2
χˆ
)2
− (αζˆ − χˆ )L¯ − αζˆ χˆ, (20)
ζˆ = ζ¯
ζ ′
, and χˆ = χ¯
χ ′
.
Proof See Appendix A.2.
Note that the optimal level of basic research depends on the economy’s share of leading
sectors in the previous period because χˆ and ζˆ depend on s1,t−1. Hence, (20) defines a
function L+B (s1,t−1) and the government’s optimal level of basic research as L B(s1,t−1) =
max{min{L+B (s1,t−1), 1/θ}, 0}, which we will use to analyse the dynamics of the economy.
Our model exhibits a distance to frontier effect, as a higher level of s1,t−1 tends to support
higher investment in basic research L B .9
9 See Gersbach et al. (2010) for a detailed analysis of this effect in a static model encompassing both applied
and basic research.
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4 Effects of basic research
Before turning to comparative statics with respect to a country’s openness, we here introduce
the different effects of basic-research investment on aggregate consumption. To identify the
effects, we will use the derivative of c with respect to L B in Eq. (18):
dc
d L B
= − α
1 − α
(
α2 A¯t
w
) α1−α 1
w
dw
d L B
ζ(L B)
+
(
α2 A¯t
w
) α1−α [ds1,t
d L B
+ ds2,t
d L B
1
γ
+ ds f,t
d L B
(1 − α(1 − α))
]
. (21)
The first summand reflects the change in consumption caused by the change in the equilibrium
wage for skilled labor induced by marginally higher basic-research investment. We refer to
this effect as the Labor Cost Effect. From Lemma 1 we infer that this effect is negative. The
second summand captures the effect of basic research on the country’s industry structure.
From the equations of motion (Eqs. (8)–(10)) we obtain
ds1,t
d L B
= s1,t−1θ(1 − η) + θη,
ds2,t
d L B
= −(1 − σ)ds1,t
d L B
,
ds f,t
d L B
= −σ ds1,t
d L B
.
This reveals that basic research increases the number of domestic sectors operating at the
technology frontier and decreases both the number of lagging sectors and the sectors with a
foreign technology leader. Inserting the changes in sector sizes, the second summand of (21)
can be written as follows:
(
α2 A¯t
w
) α1−α
[s1,t−1θ(1 − η) + θη]
[
(1 − σ)
(
1 − 1
γ
)
+ σα(1 − α)
]
. (22)
The term (1−σ)
(
1 − 1
γ
)
reflects the positive effect that marginal basic-research investment
has on consumption caused by the higher technological level. This reflects the Productivity
Effect of basic research. The other term σα(1 − α) stands for the Escape Entry Effect. It
captures the rise in consumption arising from the fact that the marginal basic-research invest-
ment induces some sectors to be held by a domestic technology leader instead of a foreign
technology leader. The advantage of a domestic firm over a foreign firm operating at the same
technological level, is that profits are retained in the country. We can summarize our findings
as follows.
Summary
A marginal change in basic research has the following three effects on aggregate consump-
tion:
(i) Labor Cost Effect
LC = − α
1 − α
(
α2 A¯t
w
) α1−α 1
w
dw
d L B
ζ(L B). (23)
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(ii) Escape Entry Effect
E E =
(
α2 A¯t
w
) α1−α
[s1,t−1θ(1 − η) + θη]σα(1 − α). (24)
(iii) Productivity Effect
P E =
(
α2 A¯t
w
) α1−α
[s1,t−1θ(1 − η) + θη](1 − σ)
(
1 − 1
γ
)
. (25)
The Escape Entry Effect and the Productivity Effect have a positive influence on aggregate
consumption, whereas the Labor Cost Effect lowers consumption. For our analysis it is impor-
tant to see how the level of openness σ affects the Escape Entry Effect and the Productivity
Effect. As σ increases entry threat, the Escape Entry Effect increases with σ . For the extreme
case of σ = 0, implying a closed economy, the Escape Entry Effect vanishes. By contrast, the
Productivity Effect decreases with σ . The reason is that the more open the economy is, the
more it will benefit from the high technology of foreign firms. Accordingly, fewer domestic
innovations can contribute to technological progress. For the maximum value σ = 1 the
economy will feature the frontier technology in every sector, irrespective of how much basic
research is performed, so in this case the Productivity Effect is zero.
5 Dynamics and steady state
In this section we first characterize the economy’s sectoral dynamics and then derive the
model’s steady state. From the equations of motion (8)–(10) we obtain
s2,t = 1 − σ
σ
s f,t , ∀ t,
and
s2,t = (1 − σ)(1 − s1,t ), ∀ t,
s f,t = σ(1 − s1,t ), ∀ t.
In other words, the sectors of the economy without a domestic technology leader are split
between domestic laggards and foreign technology leaders in accordance with the degree of
openness. Consequently, given openness, the industrial structure of the economy in period
t is entirely pinned down by the share of sectors occupied by type 1 firms. In this way, the
dynamics of the economy are fully determined by the following difference equation:
s1,t = L B(s1,t−1)ψ(s1,t−1), (26)
where ψ(s1,t−1) = s1,t−1θ(1 − η) + ηθ and L B(s1,t−1) has been given in Sect. 3.6. As
L B(s1,t−1) is a linear function, we will show that there are two distinct steady-state patterns
that may emerge. Either there is a unique and stable steady state, or there exists one unstable
steady state and two stable ones. The pattern that occurs depends on the impact of basic
research on the innovation success of private firms. A complete characterization of all pos-
sible steady-state patterns and associated stability properties is given in Appendix A.3. Here
we focus on two particularly interesting cases from an economic viewpoint.
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Fig. 1 Steady-state patterns
Proposition 2
(i) If L+B (0) > 0 and L+B (1) < 1θ , then there exists a unique and stable steady state with
0 < ss1 < 1.
(ii) If L+B (0) < 0 and L+B (1) > 1θ , then there exists one interior steady state that is not
stable. The stable steady states are given by the two corner solutions ss1 = 0 and
ss1 = 1.
Proof See Appendix A.3.
The specific interior steady-state values of the share of state 1 sectors are given by
ss1 =
−B ± √B2 − 4AC
2A
, (27)
where
A = (1 − α)L¯θ(1 − η) − 1,
B = L¯
[
θ(1 − η)
( χ¯
χ˜
− α ζ¯
ζ˜
)
+ (1 − α)ηθ
]
− (1 + α) χ¯
χ˜
,
C = ηθ L¯
( χ¯
χ˜
− α ζ¯
ζ˜
)
− α χ¯
χ˜
ζ¯
ζ˜
,
ζ˜ = (1 − σ)
(
1 − 1
γ
)
+ σα(1 − α),
χ˜ = (1 − σ)
(
1 − 1
γ
)
.
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 2 by plotting the function s1,t (s1,t−1) as defined by Eq. (26).
For each of the two steady-state patterns an example is presented. In case (i), s1,t (s1,t−1)
possesses exactly one fixed point, which constitutes the unique and stable steady state. Case
(ii) features three intersections of s1,t (s1,t−1) with the bisectoral line, of which only the
two intersections at the corners are stable. The kink in s1,t (s1,t−1) is caused by L B(s1,t−1)
reaching the upper bound 1
θ
.
Note that case (ii) may display a backwardness-trap phenomenon. Countries that are tech-
nologically advanced, i.e. that possess a high number of advanced domestic sectors, will
converge to the stable steady state that comprises only state 1 sectors, while countries that
are less advanced than the steady state level of the unstable fixed point will converge to
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the steady state without any state 1 sectors. As a consequence, the output level in the less
advanced country is substantially lower than that of the advanced country, at least if the
degree of openness is small. Given that the costs of basic research for the advanced country
in the s1 = 1 steady state do not outweigh the output gains relative to the less advanced
country in the s1 = 0 steady state, the latter country will find itself in a backwardness trap.
6 Impact of openness and other parameters
In this section, we analyze how the steady-state value of basic research denoted by LsB is
affected by changes in the degree of openness and other parameters. In addition, we discuss
how openness affects the convergence of a country to the technological frontier.
Interior steady states of basic research are given by inserting (27) back into (20). As the
steady state level of basic research cannot be derived analytically, we rely on numerical
simulations. As a basic scenario, we choose the following set of parameters: α = 0.4, γ =
1.45, θ = 2.49, η = 0.8, L¯ = 23 , A¯ = 100. α specifies the output elasticities of both types
of labor. Our choice of α = 0.4 constitutes an intermediate level of the estimates found in
the literature (e.g. Caucutt and Kumar 2003 (α = 0.5) or Blankenau et al. 2007 (α = 0.2)).
γ = 1.45 implies that the economy grows at a rate of 25 % in each period. In our model,
basic-research investments are considered for each generation, so it is convenient to think of
a period as comprising one or two decades, which generates plausible annual growth rates.10
This is also consistent with the fact that basic research exhibits major time lags between
investment and its effect on productivity (e.g. Adams 1990 or Mansfield 1998). L¯ = 23 is set
to reflect the OECD average share of the labor force with tertiary education of roughly 40 %
(World Bank 2010). With respect to the technological level we choose the normalization
A¯ = 100.
In the light of the large heterogeneity of openness across countries, we choose the inter-
mediate degree of openness σ = 0.5 in order to calibrate θ and η such that we obtain a steady
state with LsB ≈ 150 .11 This value reproduces a share of GDP devoted to basic research that
is close to 0.5 %, which constitutes the average basic research expenditures of highly indus-
trialized countries (OECD 2010).12 The basic parametrization features a steady-state pattern
as described in Proposition 2 (i).
6.1 Changes in openness
Basic scenario
We start our analysis with a detailed discussion of the effect of openness. Figure 2 depicts
how changes in the degree of openness affect the steady-state level of basic research in the
basic scenario. We observe that LsB increases with openness and also that a minimal degree of
openness is needed to induce a positive level of basic research, i.e. we obtain the corner solu-
10 For example, assuming that one period represents a decade yields an annual growth rate of 2.4 %, which
equals the average growth rate in the U.S. between the years 1960 and 2000.
11 Recall that a degree of openness of σ = 0.5 means a probability of 0.5 that a foreign firm enters a lagging
sector with leading technology.
12 The connection between LsB ≈ 150 and 0.5 % of GDP is as follows: In our model, the expenditures for
basic research accrue to wL B . Hence, to match a share of 0.5 % of GDP we solve
wL B
y = 0.005 to obtain
L B = 10495 .
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Fig. 2 Effect of openness (α = 0.4, γ = 1.45, θ = 2.49, η = 0.8, L¯ = 23 , A¯ = 100)
tion LsB = 0 for low levels of openness. To understand this result, it is instructive to consider
the three effects of basic research described in Sect. 4 (LC, E E, P E). As we saw there, an
increasing degree of openness, implying a higher probability of foreign firm entry, makes the
Escape Entry Effect stronger and lowers the Productivity Effect. Increasing openness also
reduces the negative Labor Cost Effect. The reason is as follows: Basic research increases
the skilled labor demand of intermediate firms by fostering technological progress. A higher
degree of openness mitigates this demand effect and thus lowers the Labor Cost Effect as
the import of leading technology reduces the impact of basic research on the economy’s
technological level.
Summarizing, we can say that, on the one hand, a rise in openness will increase the incen-
tives to invest in basic research by increasing the positive Escape Entry Effect and decreasing
the negative Labor Cost Effect. On the other hand, a rise in the probability of foreign firms
entering with leading technology also lowers the investment incentives by decreasing the
positive Productivity Effect. In the basic scenario, we obtain a positive relationship between
LsB and openness, as | d LCdσ + d E Edσ | dominates | d P Edσ |. This result can be interpreted in the
following way: The government will prefer to prevent foreign entry and keep the intermediate
profits in the country instead of benefiting from imported leading technology. As a result, a
larger entry threat will induce the government to increase investments in basic research, and
a steady state with a higher level of basic research is achieved.
Large technology advances
From Eq. (25) we observe that innovation step γ is a major determinant of the Productivity
Effect. The faster the frontier technology grows, the more important is the Productivity Effect,
as domestic innovations cause higher technological progress. The way openness affects the
economy when we consider larger technology advances is demonstrated in Figure 3. It reveals
that in this case we have a negative relationship between openness and steady-state basic
research. The reason is that the Productivity Effect is much larger, whereas the levels of the
Labor Cost and the Escape Entry Effect are only moderately affected by the rise in γ . As
a result, | d P Edσ | now dominates | d LCdσ + d E Edσ | and causes the falling pattern for LsB . In this
case, implementing the leading technology in the domestic country is more important than
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Fig. 3 Effect of openness for high γ (α = 0.4, γ = 1.7, θ = 2.48, η = 0.8, L¯ = 23 , A¯ = 100)
protecting the domestic intermediates’ profits. Hence, the entry of foreign firms is welcome,
as they implement leading technologies. In other words, to obtain leading technology it is
cheaper to allow foreign entry and forgo domestic profits than to draw skilled labor from
intermediate-goods production to invest in basic research.
Note that for σ = 1 the basic scenario and the scenario with high technology advances
feature the same steady-state level for basic research. Maximum openness implies that all
sectors of the domestic economy feature the leading technology, independently of the level
of basic research. So there is no Productivity Effect, and the size of γ is immaterial for the
steady-state level of basic research.
6.2 Changes in other parameters
If openness is kept fixed at σ = 0.5, the way the remaining parameters affect steady-state
basic research is straightforward and is summarized in Table 3.13 A rise of α increases the
importance of the intermediate goods in production. As a consequence, the pressure on the
market for high-skilled labor increases, which results in lower basic-research investments.
We have already indicated in the previous subsection that a rise in γ increases the Productivity
Effect and yields larger incentives to invest in basic research. Research productivity increases
with θ as well as with η, which explains the positive relationship between those parameters
and LsB . The parameter θ could, for example, reflect the country’s level of human capital.
Our theory would then imply that countries with higher stocks of human capital invest more
in basic research and have a larger share of sectors with technologically leading domestic
firms. Note that in this case there are two effects with an impact on higher basic-research
investments: (a) a direct effect due to the higher probability of success when θ is higher, and
(b) an indirect effect as the incentive to invest in basic research also increases if the share of
s1 sectors increases because there are more sectors with success probability ρ1 relative to the
smaller ρ2. So there is also the effect that ceteris paribus optimal basic-research investments
13 We do not examine changes with respect to L¯ . Such an analysis would require an assumption on scale
effects, as it would be necessary to specify θ as a function of L¯ . The one extreme would be to assume θ(L¯)
to be constant with strong scale effects. The other extreme would be the absence of scale effects by assuming
θ(L¯) · L¯ to be constant.
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Table 3 Effect of parameter
increases on LsB
α γ θ η
LsB − + + +
are higher, the closer the country is to the technological frontier (measured in terms of the
share of leading sectors).14
6.3 Convergence
What do our results imply for the effect of openness on the convergence of a country to the
technological frontier? We can apply two notions of convergence:
(1) A country converges to the technological frontier if the share of intermediates with lead-
ing technology increases (i.e., a country’s production level comes closer to the output
of a technologically advanced country with leading technology in every sector).
(2) A country converges to the technological frontier if the share of intermediates with lead-
ing technology produced by domestic firms increases (i.e., the technological knowledge
in the country increases).
With respect to the second notion of convergence focussing on the steady-state share of state-
1 sectors, we can directly infer from the previous results that greater openness will foster
convergence if the innovation steps are small and will lead to divergence if the innovation
steps are large.
Applying the broader notion of convergence (1) focussing on production output rather
than technological knowledge, we come to the same result as under notion (2) if innovation
steps are small. Figure 2 shows that increased openness fosters basic-research investments
via a strong Escape Entry Effect leading to a higher share of state-1 sectors. In addition, the
share of f-sectors with high technology increases as well. Hence the country’s output level
approaches the highest achievable at the technological frontier.
If innovation steps are large, we obtain an ambiguous result. Here a larger degree of open-
ness leads to a higher share of foreign firms with leading technology but a lower share of
domestic firms operating at the frontier. In this scenario, we observe a crowding-out effect
with respect to domestic research. Whether or not convergence occurs if openness increases
depends on the magnitude of the effects, i.e. whether the share of incoming foreign firms
is larger than the loss of domestic technology leaders. In our example setting, illustrated
by Fig. 3, basic-research investments do not decline strongly in response to an increased σ .
Hence, the total share of sectors operating with leading technology increases. In this case,
the country converges to the technological frontier in terms of production output but diverges
in terms of domestic technological knowledge.
7 Extensions and discussion
In this section we examine the robustness of our results and explore extensions of the basic
model.
14 This replicates the findings of Gersbach et al. (2010) in a dynamic context.
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7.1 Taxation
In the basic model we have made two assumptions regarding taxation, (a) uniform income
taxation and (b) the inability to tax profits of foreign firms. We first explore the consequences
if the first assumption is relaxed.
Alternative income tax schemes
As every source of income could be taxed differently, we consider in this section an arbi-
trary income tax system. Formally, let the sources of income or tax bases be denoted by
tb = (tb1, tb2, . . . , tbn), where yd = ∑nj=1 tb j is the aggregate domestic income. Each
tax base tb j is taxed at the corresponding rate τ j ≤ 1, where we denote the vector of the
different tax rates by τ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn). For example, tb1 could be labor income taxed at
the labor income tax rate τ1, while the (domestic) profits tb2 are taxed at rate τ2. Note that
some τ j might be zero and that we also allow them to be negative. Then we obtain for the
condition for a balanced budget that wL B = τ ∗ tb and the objective of the government is
to maximize c = yd − τ ∗ tb. Inserting the budget constraint into the objective function, the
latter transforms to c = yd − wL B , which is identical to (18) for any tax system (tb, τ ).
This shows that within our framework the uniform income tax scheme is equivalent to
any other income tax scheme and is thus optimal, given that foreign firms cannot be taxed.
Intuitively, the reason is that the households’ labor supply is inelastic, so they cannot avoid or
reduce their tax burden via endogenous changes in their behavior, such as increasing leisure
time relative to work or becoming an entrepreneur rather than a worker.
Taxation of foreign multinational firms
We have made the assumption that foreign multinational firms cannot be taxed. This is a polar
reflection of the ability of multinational firms to reduce their tax burden in a foreign country
by transferring costs across subsidiaries. Empirical studies provide evidence that this effect
is significant (e.g. Huizinga and Laeven 2008 or Weichenrieder 2009).
We next explore the consequences if taxation of foreign multinational firms entering the
domestic market is possible to some extent. We start with the observation that it is always
optimal to tax the foreign profits at the highest rate in our model (as such profits do not enter
domestic welfare) and to tax domestic income to finance the residual public expenditures for
basic research.15
Let τ¯ be the highest possible effective tax rate on foreign profits. This upper limit is given
by the minimum of tax rates in tax laws, by international tax treaties, and by the abilities
of multinationals to reduce their tax burden. As discussed above, it is optimal to tax foreign
profits at the highest rate τ¯ . Given any tax system on domestic income (tb, τ ) as described
above, the government’s budget constraint is wL B = τ¯ s f,tπ f,t + τ ∗ tb. For the objective of
the government we now obtain c = yd −τ ∗tb = yd −wL B +τ¯ s f,tπ f,t = y−(1−τ¯ )s f,tπ f,t .
Hence, the negative weight attached to foreign profits in the government’s objective becomes
lower, as part of the profits can be kept within the country.
Following the same steps as in the analysis in the main text reveals that this extension will
reduce the Escape Entry Effect and increase the Labor Cost Effect, while the Productivity
15 If the highest possible tax revenue from foreign profits exceeds the amount necessary to finance basic-
research expenditures, the government would optimally redistribute the surplus via (lump-sum) transfers to
the citizens.
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Effect remains unchanged.16 Consequently, being able to tax foreign profits decreases the
incentive to invest in basic research. This result also holds if one requires domestic firms to
be taxed at the same rate as foreign firms, or if all domestic income and foreign profits must
be taxed at identical rates.
We note that a polar case could occur, where the maximal tax rate τ¯ on foreign profits is
sufficiently high. Then it can be optimal to set L B = 0, even in circumstances in which the
government chooses positive levels of basic research in our basic model.
7.2 Domestic firms invest abroad
Our standard framework considers foreign firms entering the domestic market but neglects
domestic firms’ investments abroad. The model can be extended to allow domestic firms
to operate in foreign countries. In accordance with the basic set-up and the discussion in
Sect. 3.3, we assume that only a technologically leading domestic firm can be successful in a
foreign country. Hence, only domestic type 1 firms will go abroad. Suppose that each domes-
tic type 1 firm will realize expected profits abroad amounting to πa . πa typically depends
both on the size of the foreign markets and on the degree of foreign countries’ openness.
Profits πa are exogenous to the domestic government’s decision problem with respect to
basic-research expenditures.
Allowing all domestic type 1 firms to go abroad adds the term s1,t ∗πa to the government’s
objective in the basic model (18) and the constant term ds1,td L B πa to the first-order condition
(21).17 Consequently, the optimal amount of basic research unambiguously increases when
domestic firms are able to invest abroad.18 Also, the qualitative dynamics of the model remain
unchanged, but the steady state amount of leading sectors in the home country would increase.
Of course, the magnitude of this increase depends crucially on the size of the profits to be
gained in foreign countries. Accordingly, if foreign countries become more open to FDI, the
home country will react by increasing expenditure on basic research.
7.3 Private R&D
The research process in our framework can be interpreted as a simplified way of capturing
the role of basic research in facilitating private research, along the lines of Cozzi and Galli
(2011a, 2009, 2011b) or Aghion and Howitt (1996). In these papers, basic research creates
fundamental ideas taken up by private researchers and developed into marketable products.
We have simplified our model by assuming that private, applied R&D is costless. This should
not be taken literally. Rather, it reflects the underlying assumption that the intensity of private
R&D in each sector is independent of the amount of basic research.
16 Formally, by including the tax rate τ¯ on foreign profits, ζ(L B ) as defined by (19) changes to ζ(L B ) =
s1,t + s2,t 1γ + s f,t (1− (1− τ¯ )α(1−α)). From the first-order condition in Sect. 4 we can infer that the Escape
Entry Effect in the basic model is multiplied by the factor 1− τ¯ when foreign profits are taxed. Further, we see
that the Labor Cost Effect depends on ζ(L B ). As the latter becomes larger, the Labor Cost Effect increases in
magnitude.
17 Note that whether or not the profits gained in the foreign country are taxed in the domestic country does not
affect the extension of the objective function suggested above. This follows from the arguments in Sect. 7.1.
18 Formally, after including the extension, the first-order condition writes dcd L B +
ds1,t
d L B πa = 0, where the
first summand reflects the old first-order condition (21). Now since ds1,td L B πa is positive and independent of
L B and d
2c
d L2B
< 0, the optimal amount of L B must be larger than in the basic model to satisfy the extended
first-order condition.
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In Appendix D, we provide a model extension with endogenous applied R&D. We assume
that the firms hire applied researchers to maximize their expected profits. Including endoge-
nous private research, which is complementary to basic research, implies the following. First,
the marginal productivity of basic research additionally depends on applied-research inten-
sity. Second, the labor costs increase as private research also draws on the economy’s skilled
labor supply. In our extended model, we identify the same three effects of basic research as
described in the basic model set-up. However, the magnitudes of the effects differ.
7.4 Foreign firm entry depends on basic research
So far, the probability that foreign firms will enter the domestic market (our measure of
openness σ ) has been exogenous. It is conceivable that in some cases multinational firms
will locate in countries to benefit from local basic-research activities.19 This could be incor-
porated into the model by letting σ be an increasing function of basic research σ(L B). The
government’s first-order condition then changes to
dc
d L B
∣∣∣∣
σ
+ ∂c
∂σ
dσ
d L B
= 0, (28)
where the first term represents the derivative of the government’s objective for a given level
of σ , as in (21) in the basic model. The second term captures the influence of basic research
on the probability of foreign firm entry. In this extension, the derivative of σ with respect
to basic research is positive. If σ has a positive effect on domestic consumption, then the
last summand is positive, implying that in an interior solution the optimal amount of basic
research increases relative to the solution in the basic model set-up.20 This is likely to be the
case when innovation steps are large. The opposite will be true if openness exerts a negative
effect on domestic consumption possibilities, which can occur if innovation steps are small.21
Hence, if σ positively depends on L B , it tends to moderate the relation between openness
and L B in the following sense: Consider the formulation σ(L B) = σ¯ + σˆ (L B), where σ¯ is an
exogenously given level of openness and σˆ (L B) describes the additional attractiveness due
to the country’s basic-research investments. Without the additional endogenous term in open-
ness σˆ (L B), the relation between optimal basic research and σ¯ is positive when innovation
steps are low, as illustrated in Fig. 2. Our previous discussion suggests that the increase in
L B with respect to σ¯ would be smaller in the scenario with the endogenous part in openness.
Intuitively, the main motive for basic research activities is to avoid foreign competition and
19 See e.g. Almeida (1996) or Kuemmerle (1999) for empirical evidence.
20 We assume that the maximization problem is still concave, i.e., that the second-order condition for a
maximum is satisfied.
21 Taking the derivative of c with respect to σ yields
∂c
∂σ
= ψ(w) [(1 − θ L B )s1,t−1 + (1 − ηθ L B )(1 − s1,t−1)]
[
1 − α(1 − α) − 1
γ
]
+ dψ(w)
dw
∂w
∂σ
ζ(L B ),
where ψ(w) =
(
α2 A¯t
w
) α
1−α
.
dψ(w)
dw is negative and
∂w
∂σ
is positive. The reason for the latter is that the
foreign firms import leading technology and replace lagging type 2 firms, thus increasing demand for skilled
labor in intermediate-goods production. Consequently, the last summand is negative, i.e. there is a labor cost
effect due to openness. Concerning the first summand, the term in the second brackets illustrates the main
trade-off associated with foreign entry-importing leading technology at the price of intermediate profits that
do not accrue to citizens of the country. The first summand is positive for large innovation steps γ , where the
imported leading technology yields higher additional welfare than the profits exported by the foreign firms.
For low values of γ the first term also becomes negative.
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keep profits within the country. When σ depends positively on L B , basic research is not as
effective in pursuing this goal. On the other hand, when innovation steps are large, our results
in the basic model indicate that the basic-research levels are lower, the higher the country’s
openness is in order to import leading technology. With σ as an increasing function of L B ,
basic research investment helps to attract foreign firms, so basic research levels will be higher
than in the basic set-up.
7.5 Openness improves technology adoption
In our basic model set-up, a higher degree of openness increases a country’s aggregate pro-
ductivity only by foreign direct investment of firms with leading technology. This assumption
is based on the idea that specific knowledge is necessary to produce world frontier techno-
logical products. The latter is brought in by the foreign firm to the domestic sectors lagging
behind. However, a country’s openness might also induce technological spillovers to domes-
tic firms more directly, e.g. via increased exchange of technological information, turnover of
knowledge-bearing employees, or increased trade facilitating reverse engineering.
There are two ways how our model could be adapted to capture direct spillovers from
openness to domestic firms. First, let the probability that a foreign firm enters with lead-
ing technology be φσ , where σ is the degree of openness and (1 − φ) ∈ (0, 1) reflects
the strength of spillovers to domestic firms. That is, the probability that a firm whose own
innovation efforts were not successful realizes direct spillovers from openness, i.e. adopts a
technology from the world frontier without cost and becomes a type-1 leader is (1 − φ)σ .
Adapting the equations of motion for the country’s industry structure correspondingly and
solving the government’s problem reveals that the Labor Cost Effect and the Productivity
Effect remain unchanged while the Escape Entry Effect decreases. The latter is due to the
fact that only a share φσ instead of σ of the profits go abroad. This decreases the effect of
openness on the incentives to invest in basic research.
A second way to extend our model would be to make the productivity of basic research
dependent on the degree of openness: θ(σ ). Then a higher degree of openness increases the
knowledge spillovers realized from abroad which allow a better use of the basic research
inputs to create world leading technology. In this case, an increase in σ would cause higher
values of θ thereby making basic research investments more attractive.
8 Empirical support
In this section, we provide some empirical support for our main theoretical prediction that the
effect of openness on basic research depends on the size of the innovation steps. Limited data
availability on basic research expenditures poses a considerable challenge for an empirical
investigation. Hence, our analysis in this section represents a first pass in which we focus
on the type of regressions that appear to be most suitable to address the hypothesis. A more
complete empirical investigation and the examination of alternative specifications is left for
future research when more data will be available.
8.1 Empirical specification and data description
We consider the following empirical specification
Basic Researchi t = β0 + β1γi t + β2σi t + β3γi t ∗ σi t + δXit + τt + αi + εi t , (29)
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with basic research expenditures on the left-hand side and innovation steps γi t , openness
σi t and the interaction between these two variables on the right-hand side of the equation.
The matrix Xit comprises additional control variables, which we describe below. To preclude
spurious correlations simply because variables are trending, we control for exponential trends
in all our estimations. Moreover, we include a full set of time dummies to rule out that our
results are driven by period-specific effects. The respective terms are included in τt in (29).22
The parameter αi captures unobserved time-invariant country-specific characteristics and εi t
represents the error term.
We use five year averages of unbalanced panel data from 1981 to 2005 including most
OECD countries.23 The only source of data on basic research expenditures is the OECD’s
Main Science and Technology Indicators Database (OECD 2010) where we obtain basic
research expenditures as a percentage of GDP. We use the economic globalization index
available at KOF (Dreher 2006) as our measure of the countries’ openness which incorpo-
rates actual economic flows such as foreign direct investment and trade, as well as economic
restrictions like tariffs and capital account restrictions. In this way, the economic globaliza-
tion index provides a comprehensive measure of openness.24 In the appendix, we show that
we obtain similar results when instead using data on foreign direct investment provided by
the World Bank to reflect the countries’ openness.
Data on the countries’ per capita growth rates of GDP, provided by the World Bank’s
World development indicators (WDI) (World Bank 2010), are taken as a proxy of the inno-
vation steps γ .25 In all of the following estimations we include the share of the population
with completed tertiary education available from Barro and Lee’s data set on educational
attainment (Barro and Lee 2010) and the countries’ distance to the technological frontier
which is calculated as the relative difference of the country’s GDP per capita to U.S.-GDP
per capita. Those data are taken from WDI.
In some regressions we include further variables taken from WDI to control for poten-
tial differences in the productivity of basic research. These are: strength of legal rights
index (weak=0 to strong=10), the average costs of business start-up procedures (perc. of
GDP/capita), income and profit taxes (perc. of total taxes), taxes on goods and services (perc.
of value added in industry and services), government consumption expenditures (perc. of
22 That is, τt = λ0t + λ1t1 + λ2t2 + λ3t3 + · · ·, where t1, t2, . . . represent the period dummies for periods
t = 1 (1981–1985), t = 2 (1986–1990), and so on. However, our results do not change substantially when
controlling only for time dummies or trends.
23 Averages are taken for the time periods 1981–1985, 1986–1990, and so forth. If not all 5 observations
within the respective 5-year period are available, we use the average of the available observations and interpret
it as the 5 year average (i.e., we impute the average value of the available observations for the missing values
within the respective 5-year period). The following OECD-countries cannot be included in the analysis either
because data on the dependent or on one of the independent variables are missing. In the regressions without
the time-invariant controls: Belgium, Canada, Chile, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Turkey, United
Kingdom. When the time-invariant controls are included in the regression model, the countries Denmark,
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, and New Zealand additionally drop out of the sample.
24 More precisely, data on actual flows includes Trade (perc. of GDP), Foreign Direct Investment (perc. of
GDP), Portfolio Investment (perc. of GDP), and Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (perc. of GDP). Data
on economic restrictions contain Hidden Import Barriers, Mean Tariff Rate, Taxes on International Trade,
and Capital Account Restrictions. A precise description of the data and its sources can be found at http://
globalization.kof.ethz.ch/.
25 In principle, it would be possible to use the growth rate of GDP per capita of the U.S. as a proxy of the
growth rate of the world’s technological frontier. By using country-specific growth rates, we allow for the
innovation steps to differ across countries. This may reflect infrastructure or institutional differences across
countries that may impact technology adoption and thus cause that innovation steps differ. Including country
specific growth rates provides a further source of variation for the empirical analysis.
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GDP), natural resource rents (perc. of GDP), domestic credit provided by banking sector
(perc. of GDP), and bank non-performing loans (perc. of total gross loans). Data on these
controls are even scarcer than on our dependent variables and main regressors. Further,
the within-country variation of the data on these variables is substantially smaller than the
between-country variation. For these reasons, we will only employ time-invariant country
averages of these variables.
Except for the share of the population with tertiary education and the measure on the
strength of legal rights, we use all variables (also the dependent variable, i.e. basic research
expenditures) in logarithmic scale. Accordingly, the corresponding coefficients can be inter-
preted as elasticities.
8.2 Empirical procedure and estimation results
Our main theoretical result that openness has a positive effect on basic research expenditures
when innovation steps are low and a negative effect when innovation steps are high suggests
that β2 > 0 and β3 < 0.
As unobserved country-specific heterogeneity may be correlated with the regressors, we
start by estimating a fixed effects regression model. The first column in Table 4 shows the
results without the interaction term between growth and openness while the second column
illustrates the results when the interaction term is included. The results indicate that without
the interaction term openness has no significant effect on basic research expenditures. How-
ever, we observe in the second column of Table 4 that the coefficient of the interaction term
possesses the expected negative sign and is highly significant. Moreover, the coefficient of
openness β2 also shows the expected positive sign and an F test reveals that β2 and β3 are
jointly significant.
We obtain similar results when applying a random effects regression model or a pooled
regression as indicated in columns (3) and (4). However, in the pooled regression the signif-
icance level of the coefficient of the interaction term decreases slightly.26
A Hausman-test cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimated values of the coefficients in
the fixed effects model differ from those in the random effects model.27 This allows us to use
the more efficient random effects model and to include additional time-invariant controls. As
mentioned in the data description section, these variables mainly control for the productivity
of basic research as reflected in the parameters θ and η in the theoretical model.28
As indicated in columns (5)–(7), including these controls into our econometric model
does not change our main results. Again, openness shows no significant influence on basic
research expenditures when the interaction term between openness and growth is not taken
into account (col. (5)). With its inclusion, the interaction term is highly significant in both the
random effects model (col. (6)) and the pooled regression (col. (7)). Note that in the random
effects regression model (col. (6)) the p value of the interaction term is only slightly higher
than 0.01 at 0.0123. Again, β2 and β3 are jointly significant in the random effects as well as
in the pooled regression model.
26 The p value of the interaction term in the pooled regression is 0.028 versus 0.001 in the random effects
estimation and 0.0037 in the fixed effects model.
27 The test of H0: “The difference in coefficients of (2) and (3) is not systematic” yields a p value of 0.999.
Hence H0 cannot be rejected.
28 Due to the small number of within-country observations on these variables, we are not able to add these
controls to the fixed effects estimation. Otherwise, our already small sample would have been reduced even
further, thereby substantially decreasing the degrees of freedom of our estimation.
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Table 4 Main results
Log basic research expenditures/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FE FE RE Pooled RE RE Pooled
Log growth 0.049 2.037*** 2.176*** 3.206** –0.009 1.805** 2.678**
(0.051) (0.635) (0.672) (1.354) (0.045) (0.738) (1.049)
Log openness 0.156 0.623 0.577 0.398 0.226 0.777 1.160**
(0.686) (0.621) (0.575) (0.628) (0.562) (0.529) (0.522)
Log openness * –0.469*** –0.503*** –0.749** –0.428** –0.629**
log growth
(0.146) (0.154) (0.320) (0.171) (0.240)
Log distance 0.328 0.423* 0.474*** 0.461*** 0.314* 0.295 0.584***
to frontier (0.259) (0.233) (0.125) (0.149) (0.181) (0.184) (0.171)
Share of population 0.004 0.011 0.018** 0.024* 0.005 0.007 0.056**
w. tertiary education (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.024)
Time-invar. controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.514 0.566 0.410 0.443 0.690 0.700 0.777
N 81 81 81 81 69 69 69
Notes: In all regressions we controlled for time trends and periodic effects via time dummies. Controlling only
for either of the two do not affect the results substantially. Standard error estimates are cluster-robust (cluster
is country) and reported in parentheses
*** Significant at the 1 % level
** Significant at the 5 % level
* Significant at the 10 % level
There might be concern regarding the potential endogeneity of the regressors due to omit-
ted variables or reverse causality. Given that there is typically a substantial time lag between
basic research expenditures and their effect via knowledge generation on GDP growth, the
distance to the technological frontier, and possibly openness, it is unlikely that reverse cau-
sality matters significantly in our specification.
Nevertheless, we estimate the random effects model using two-stage-least squares with
one period lags as instruments for the variables growth, openness and distance to frontier. The
estimation results are reported in Appendix E. At the first stage, the one-period lags turn out
to satisfy instrument relevance, indicated by F tests of joint significance of the instruments
in the reduced form regressions and a rank test of the reduced form equations. The second
stage estimates indicate that the signs of the coefficients remain the same as the ones in the
regressions reported in Table 4. In particular, the coefficient of the interaction term between
openness and growth is negative. However, the corresponding p value is only about 0.2. The
p values of most of the other coefficients are of similar size. This reflects the decrease of the
degrees of freedom (using lags as instruments reduces the number of observations from 69 to
only 48) and the lower efficiency of the IV-estimator. Although these results are suggestive,
the endogeneity of regressors should be readdressed when a larger data set will be available.29
In summary, we provided some empirical support for the importance of our theoretical
results. As mentioned at the beginning, the empirical results have to be interpreted with
29 Future reassessments will be possible as many of the large organizations such as the World Bank and the
OECD are collecting data on a regular basis and have substantially increased the scope of variables they are
collecting.
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caution.30 As more and more data become available in the future, the scope for empirical
analyses will increase. Our results lend confidence that our theoretical predictions will find
empirical support in later studies with substantially larger data sets.
9 Conclusion
We develop a model of growth that incorporates basic research and the entry of foreign high-
tech firms, while the level of basic research is determined by a government maximizing the
consumption of the current generation. On that basis, we derive the steady states of the econ-
omy and study how changes in the degree of openness affect the incentives to invest in basic
research. Our main insight that a higher degree of openness tends to justify higher investment
in basic research may be important for policy discussions in industrialized countries.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Using (15) to determine the derivative dw(L B )d L B we obtain
dw(L B)
d L B
= (1 − α)α2 A¯αt
[
χ(L B)
L¯ − L B
]−α
χ ′(L¯ − L B) + χ(L B)
(L¯ − L B)2
.
Since χ(L B) = χ ′L B + χ¯ , the numerator of the last fraction can be written as χ ′ L¯ + χ¯ =
χ(L¯). From the definition of χ(L B) according to Eq. (14) we know that χ(L B) is positive
for all values of L B . As a consequence, dw(L B )d L B > 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
By inserting (15) in (18), the government’s objective function reads
c = ζ(L B)
(
A¯t (L¯ − L B)
χ(L B)
)α
. (30)
It yields the following first-order condition with respect to the choice of L B :
αχ(L¯)
χ(L B)(L¯ − L B)
ζ(L B) = ζ ′.
By expansion, this condition can be transformed to
L¯(αζˆ − χˆ) + αζˆ χˆ + L B[(1 + α)χˆ − (1 − α)L¯] + L2B = 0.
30 For example, the results could suffer from selection bias if some countries have particular reasons (corre-
lated with our regressors) for not providing data on basic research expenditures. Moreover, it will be useful to
employ more refined measures of innovation steps.
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The solution to this quadratic equation is
L B = 1 − α2 L¯ −
1 + α
2
χˆ ±
√(
1 − α
2
L¯ − 1 + α
2
χˆ
)2
− (αζˆ − χˆ )L¯ − αζˆ χˆ . (31)
In order to determine which of the two solutions maximizes period t consumption, consider
the government’s objective function as given in (18):
(
α2 A¯t
w
) α1−α [
s1,t + s2,t 1
γ
+ s f,t (1 − α(1 − α))
]
.
From Lemma 1 we know that the wage strictly increases with L B . Taking a close look at
w(L B) given in Eq. (15), we see that for L B → L¯ , the wage becomes infinite. As the second
factor in (18), ζ(L B), is bound from above for L B → L¯ , consumption converges to 0 if the
entire skilled labor force is employed in the basic-research sector. Moreover, we see that c
cannot become negative, so when L B → L¯ , it converges to 0 from above. As a next step, we
show that the objective function is concave in L B , which implies that the second derivative
of (30) with respect to L B should be negative:
A¯αt
[
−2αζ ′
(
L¯ − L B
χ(L B)
)α−1
χ(L B) + χ ′(L¯ − L B)
χ(L B)2
− α(1 − α)ζ(L B)
(
L¯ − L B
χ(L B)
)α−2 (
χ(L B) + χ ′(L¯ − L B)
χ(L B)2
)2
+2αζ(L B)
(
L¯ − L B
χ(L B)
)α−1
χ ′
(
χ(L B) + χ ′(L¯ − L B)
)
χ(L B)3
]
< 0.
The middle term is negative, so we can neglect it. The remaining part can be reduced to
−ζ ′χ¯ + χ ′ζ¯ < 0,
which equals
− [s1,t−1θ(1 − η) + ηθ ]
(
(1 − σ)
(
1 − 1
γ
)
+ σα(1 − α)
)(
σ + (1 − σ) 1
γ
)
+ [s1,t−1θ(1 − η) + ηθ ](1 − σ)
(
1 − 1
γ
)(
(1 − σ) 1
γ
+ σ(1 − α(1 − α))
)
< 0.
The inequality can be further reduced to the form
−[s1,t−1θ(1 − η) + ηθ ]σα(1 − α) < 0,
which obviously holds. Hence, we now know that (30) either falls monotonically in the
interval L B ∈ [0, L¯) or it features a single extremum, which must be a maximum. To show
that
L+B =
1 − α
2
L¯ − 1 + α
2
χˆ +
√(
1 − α
2
L¯ − 1 + α
2
χˆ
)2
− (αζˆ − χˆ)L¯ − αζˆ χˆ,
the larger of the two solutions given in (31) always constitutes the possible maximum, it is
sufficient to show that L+B < L¯ holds. A number of algebraic manipulations transform this
condition into
(L¯ + χˆ )(L¯ + ζˆ ) > 0. (32)
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The fact that condition (32) is satisfied is straightforward, as χˆ > 0 and ζˆ > 0 due to
χ¯ , ζ¯ , χ ′, ζ ′ > 0.
Finally, L+B constitutes a maximum in the relevant interval L B ∈ [0, 1θ ], given that 0 ≤
L+B ≤ 1/θ and L+B ∈ R. The latter condition guarantees that the expression under the square
root of L+B is positive.
If L+B > 1/θ , it is clear that the objective function is increasing with L B over the entire
relevant range L B ∈ [0, 1θ ]. Hence, in this case L B = 1θ is the solution to the maximization
problem.
A.3 Steady-state analysis
Using the unique solution with respect to basic-research investment as given in Proposition
1, we obtain the steady-state amount of domestic high technology sectors, ss1, by solving
s1 = L B(s1) [s1θ(1 − η) + ηθ ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ(s1)
. (33)
First we rearrange (33) according to
θ L B(s1) = θs1
s1θ(1 − η) + ηθ ,
in order to check that for all interior solutions 0 < ss1 < 1 the condition 0 < L B <
1
θ
must
hold. It is straightforward that this is the case, as the right-hand side increases with s1 and
reaches one when s1 = 1 and zero when s1 = 0. This implies that we can focus on L B = L+B
as given in Proposition 1 to determine the interior solutions.
We redefine ζ ′ as ψ(s1)ζ˜ , where ζ˜ = (1 − σ)(1 − 1γ ) + σα(1 − α), and similarly we can
rewrite χ ′ as ψ(s1)χ˜ , where χ˜ = (1 − σ)(1 − 1γ ). By inserting L+B into (33), the equation
transforms to
s21 [(1 − α)L¯θ(1 − η) − 1] + s1
(
L¯
[
θ(1 − η)
( χ¯
χ˜
− α ζ¯
ζ˜
)
+ (1 − α)ηθ
]
− (1 + α) χ¯
χ˜
)
+ηθ L¯
( χ¯
χ˜
− α ζ¯
ζ˜
)
− α χ¯
χ˜
ζ¯
ζ˜
= 0.
As this is a quadratic equation in s1, there can be no more than two steady states where
L B = L+B .
With respect to steady states at the corners s1 = 0 and s1 = 1, we can state the following:
If L+B (0) ≤ 0 there exists a steady state at s1 = 0. From Proposition 1 we know that L B = 0
if L+B (s1,t−1) ≤ 0. Thus, it is clear that condition (33) is satisfied under these circumstances.
Similarly, if L+B (1) ≥ 1θ there exists a steady state at s1 = 1. Again, from Proposition 1
we know that L B = 1θ if L+B (s1,t−1) ≥ 1θ . That (33) holds for L B = 1θ and s1 = 1 is
straightforward.
With the above considerations we can now proceed to a complete steady-state analysis:
1. If L+B (0) > 0 and L
+
B (1) <
1
θ
, then L B(s1)ψ(s1) crosses the bisectoral line once only
and from above at 0 < s1 < 1. Thus, there exists a unique and stable steady state with
0 < ss1 < 1.
2. If L+B (0) > 0 and L
+
B (1) = 1θ , then L B(s1)ψ(s1) either crosses the bisectrix once only
and from above at s1 = 1 or it crosses the bisectrix twice, first from above at 0 < s1 < 1,
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and second from below at s1 = 1. In the first case, the corner solution ss1 = 1 is the
unique and stable steady state. In the second case, only the steady state with 0 < ss1 < 1
is stable.
3. If L+B (0) > 0 and L
+
B (1) >
1
θ
, then L B(s1)ψ(s1) either crosses the bisectrix once only
and from above at s1 = 1 or it crosses the bisectrix three times, first from above at
0 < sa1 < 1, second from below at 0 < s
b
1 < 1, where s
a
1 < s
b
1 , and third from above at
s1 = 1. In the first case, the corner solution ss1 = 1 is the unique and stable steady state.
In the second case, only sa1 of the two interior steady states is stable. A second stable
steady state is given at the corner ss1 = 1.
4. If L+B (0) = 0 and L+B (1) < 1θ , then L B(s1)ψ(s1) either crosses the bisectrix once only
and from above at s1 = 0 or it crosses the bisectoral line twice, first from below at s1 = 0
and then from above at 0 < s1 < 1. In the first case, the corner solution ss1 = 0 is the
unique and stable steady state. In the second case, only the steady state with 0 < ss1 < 1
is stable.
5. If L+B (0) = 0 and L+B (1) = 1θ , L B(s1)ψ(s1) crosses the bisectrix twice, first at s1 = 0
then at s1 = 1. If L B(s1)ψ(s1) > s1 (< s1) at s1 ∈ (0, 1), then it crosses the bisectrix
from below (above) at s1 = 0 and from above (below) at s1 = 1. Hence, the unique and
stable steady state is given by the corner solution ss1 = 1 (ss1 = 0).
6. If L+B (0) = 0 and L+B (1) > 1θ , then L B(s1)ψ(s1) crosses the bisectoral line either twice,
first at s1 = 0 from below then at s1 = 1 from above, or it crosses the bisectrix three
times, first from above at s1 = 0, second from below at 0 < s1 < 1, and third from above
at s1 = 1. In the first case, only the corner steady state given by ss1 = 1 is stable. In the
second case, the interior steady state is not stable, while both corner solutions ss1 = 0
and ss1 = 1 are stable steady states.
7. If L+B (0) < 0 and L
+
B (1) <
1
θ
, then L B(s1)ψ(s1) either crosses the bisectrix once only
and from above at s1 = 0 or it crosses the bisectoral line three times, first from above at
s1 = 0, second from below at 0 < sa1 < 1, and third from above at 0 < sb1 < 1, whereas
sa1 < s
b
1 . In the first case, the corner solution s
s
1 = 0 is the unique and stable steady state.
In the second case, only sb1 of the two interior steady states is stable. A second stable
steady state is given at the corner ss1 = 0.
8. If L+B (0) < 0 and L
+
B (1) = 1θ , then L B(s1)ψ(s1) either crosses the bisectrix twice, first
at s1 = 0 from above then at s1 = 1 from below, or it crosses the bisectrix three times,
first from above at s1 = 0, second from below at 0 < s1 < 1, and third from above at
s1 = 1. In the first case, only the corner steady state given by ss1 = 0 is stable. In the
second case, the interior steady state is not stable, while both corner solutions ss1 = 0
and ss1 = 1 are stable steady states.
9. If L+B (0) < 0 and L
+
B (1) >
1
θ
, then L B(s1)ψ(s1) crosses the bisectrix three times, first
at s1 = 0 from above, second at 0 < s1 < 1 from below, and third at s1 = 1 from
above. Thus, the interior steady state is not stable, while both corner solutions ss1 = 0
and ss1 = 1 are stable steady states.
B Concept of openness
The concept of openness introduced in our model can be interpreted as follows:
We assume that firms headquartered in a foreign country and owned by foreigners incur
costs from introducing a leading technology into the domestic market and operating in a
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foreign country.31 Those costs are heterogeneous and depend on the country’s degree of
openness.32 The higher the country’s openness, the more likely it is that an innovating for-
eign firm will find it profitable to introduce the new technology into the domestic market.
In this way, we specify openness as the probability σ that an innovating foreign firm will
benefit from entering the domestic market.
An alternative view on openness is the following: The outside world that forms the tech-
nological frontier is divided into two parts. Firms in the first part incur small costs by entering
the domestic country and operating in it. The probability that innovations in this part will push
the technological frontier of a particular industry to the next level is given by σ (0 < σ < 1).
Firms in the second part of the outside world have high entry costs and are deterred from
entering the domestic market under any circumstances. The probability of the rise in the
technological frontier in a specific industry being caused by innovations in this part of the
world is 1 − σ .
Our model is compatible with both perspectives on openness. The consequences of either
view of openness for the domestic industries are as stated in Sect. 3.3:
• If the domestic firm lags behind the technological frontier, a foreign firm will enter with
probability σ and capture the entire market in this sector.
• If the domestic firm produces at the technological frontier, no foreign entry will occur in
the respective sector.
We note that due to the assumption that operating in the domestic market is costly for a
foreign firm, Bertrand competition implies negative profits for the foreign firm if it possesses
the same technological level as the domestic firm (which would realize zero profits). Hence,
the foreign firm will only enter or stay in the market if its technological level is higher than
that of the domestic firm.
C Foundation of the model with patent races
In this section, we provide another interpretation of the model’s micro-foundation using
patent races.
In each sector, there is a finite number of domestic firms that can engage in innovation/pat-
ent races at the beginning of each period. There are two types of R&D projects that the firms
may conduct:
(1) high-risk research aiming at technological level A¯t
(2) low-risk research aiming either at technological level A¯t−1 (e.g., adopting an existing
intermediate technology from the previous world technology frontier) or at inventing
around an existing patent of an intermediate good producer at technological level A¯t−1.
Establishing a research project of type (2) incurs a small fixed cost ε > 0, caused e.g. by
the necessity to first learn about the existing intermediate goods at this technology level. For
simplicity, we assume that the risky research project will not incur costs. In both types of
31 This concept is reminiscent of treating entry costs in the Melitz-type trade models (e.g. Melitz 2003).
32 For example, if the technology is developed abroad, the introduction of the new technology may be ham-
pered by the legal and institutional framework in the domestic country. Further, the introduction of a new
technology in a different country may necessitate the build-up or restructuring of production capacities, the
employment of experts from the foreign country, and the like. The amount of costs incurred by these activities
is likely to differ depending on the technology and the structure of the innovating foreign firm. Further, it is
also very likely that these costs will be lower in countries that are very open to foreign trade and FDI.
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R&D, the first firm to succeed obtains a patent valid for two periods (which is ‘de facto’
equivalent to a patent of longer validity).
With respect to research project (1), we assume that each firm possesses the same prob-
ability of innovation success, depending on the level of basic research. Also, each firm that
participates in the race possesses equal probability of being the first to be successful. Since
there are no fixed costs for participating in the patent race, all firms will participate in the risky
innovation project (1).33 The probability that one firm will succeed in creating an innovation
at the new technological frontier is ρ1(L B) if the respective sector has been in state 1 in the
previous period and ρ2(L B) if the sector was in state 2 or f before.34
For the low-risk project (2), the probability that a firm will be successful is one, and the
fastest firm obtains the patent. In each period, the following sequence of events occur:
1. Government chooses basic research
2. Domestic firms engage in risky research projects
3. Technological frontier increases to A¯t = γ 1−αα A¯t−1
4. If no domestic firm was successful in the risky research project, domestic firms may
decide to enter the patent race with low-risk research at a small cost ε
5. Foreign intermediate firms decide whether to enter (or keep on operating in) the domestic
market
6. Production of consumption good
Again, in the subgame-perfect equilibrium, the foreign firm will only enter (or keep oper-
ating) if it is able to offer an intermediate good at a higher technological level.35 Concerning
the patent race with low-risk research, domestic firms will only participate if in period t
no domestic patent for an intermediate with technological level At−1 exists. Note that if a
patent held by a foreign firm exists, it will be profitable to invent around it in anticipation of
the foreign firm leaving the market if competition at the same technological level ensues.36
Of course, this is just one interpretation of our set-up. One can easily find others that add
further realistic features, such as simultaneous patent races with respect to high- and low-risk
research.
D Extended model with private R&D
We outline an extended model that includes private R&D.37 Suppose that instead of (6) and
(7) the probability of innovation success of a type j firm, j = 1, 2, is
ρ j (L B , L A, j ) = min
{√
θ j L B L A, j , 1
}
, (34)
33 Note that we could also assume that the risky project is costly for the firms. Then, however, there exists a
positive level of L B for which ρ1(L B ) and ρ2(L B ) are zero because no firm will participate in the innovation
race due to prospects of negative profits from participating.
34 This assumption reflects the familiarity of the domestic firms with previous frontier technology.
35 This is due to the small operating costs in the domestic market.
36 With the current specification of the game, it may occur for σ very close to one that no firm will find it
profitable to engage in the second patent race because no firm succeeded in the first one, even if no domestic
patent at the A¯t−1 level exists. This can be avoided by assuming that the incumbent (e.g. the type 2 firm that
operated in the market in the previous period or the one that has been outcompeted by the foreign firm) can
participate in the race without costs, while the ‘outsiders’ incur participation costs.
37 See Gersbach et al. (2010) for a detailed analysis of how openness affects the interplay between basic and
applied research in a static model. Here we provide a short sketch of such an extension.
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where L A, j denotes private or applied R&D of a type j firm. The specification in Eq. (34)
exhibits complementarities between basic and applied research. Let θ1 = θˆ and θ2 = ηθˆ .
For simplicity, we assume that in all sectors, s1,t−1 and s2,t−1, applied research is conducted
by type 1 or type 2 incumbents, respectively. In the sectors occupied by a foreign firm, a
type 2 firm employs applied researchers in the hope of leapfrogging to the technological
frontier.38 Given the technological level A(i) of the intermediate product i , a monopolist can
earn profits as given by (5). Consequently, the type j firm will choose the optimal number
of applied researchers in its private R&D lab by solving the following problem:
max
L A, j
E[π j ] = ρ j (L B , L A, j )π( A¯) + (1 − ρ j (L B , L A, j ))(1 − σ) 1
γ
π( A¯) − wL A, j , (35)
where we use π( A¯) as a shorthand notation for the profits to be made by offering an inter-
mediate good of quality A¯ as given by (5). The first-order condition for an interior solution
of the firm’s problem is given by
dρ j (L B , L A, j )
d L A, j
π( A¯)
(
1 − 1 − σ
γ
)
− w = 0. (36)
Hence, we obtain
L A, j = 14
[
π( A¯)
w
(
1 − 1 − σ
γ
)]2
θ j L B . (37)
Inserting the optimal level of applied research back into (34) yields
ρ1(L B) = min {θ(w)L B , 1} , (38)
ρ2(L B) = min {ηθ(w)L B , 1} , (39)
where θ(w) = 12 π( A¯)w
(
1 − 1−σ
γ
)
θˆ . The difference to (6) and (7) is that the marginal produc-
tivity of basic research now depends on the wage for skilled labor w and other exogenous
parameters, such as the innovative step γ and openness σ .
The wage for skilled labor depending on the amount of basic research is determined by
the market clearing condition for skilled labor:
L¯ = L B + st−1L A,1 + (1 − st−1)L A,2 +
1∫
0
Lx (i)di. (40)
This equation does not yield a closed-form solution for w(L B). However, we can write the
government’s objective equivalently to (18) as c =
(
α2 A¯t
w
) α
1−α
ζ(L B , w), where we adapt
the function ζ by substituting θ through θ(w) to reflect the impact of applied research. In
this way, we obtain for the first-order condition:
dc
d L B
= − α
1 − α
(
α2 A¯t
w
) α1−α 1
w
dw
d L B
ζ(L B) +
(
α2 A¯t
w
) α1−α ∂ζ(L B , w)
∂w
dw
d L B
+
(
α2 A¯t
w
) α1−α [∂s1,t
∂L B
+ ∂s2,t
∂L B
1
γ
+ ∂s f,t
∂L B
(1 − α(1 − α))
]
. (41)
38 It is also possible to formulate patent races with a finite number of contestants.
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In analogy to the decomposition in Sect. 4, the Labor Cost Effect now comprises the first
two summands of (41), while the two other effects can be written as in (24) and (25) when
substituting θ by θ(w). As θ(w) is a declining function of w, ∂ζ(L B ,w)
∂w
is negative, while we
still expect dwd L B to be positive. Hence, by including applied R&D, the labor costs of basic
research increase, which tends to reduce optimal basic-research levels compared to the basic
model version. Moreover, as θ(w) is a declining function, ρ j (L B) tends to be a concave
rather than a linear function in L B . Hence, the linear approximation may underestimate the
productivity of basic research at low levels of L B , while tending to overestimate it at higher
levels. The bottom line is that if we include private, applied R&D in the model, we can
identify the same effects, but their magnitudes change.
E Empirical Appendix
In this appendix, we first provide estimation results of fixed effects and random effects
regressions models as in Sect. 8, but with foreign direct investment data from WDI to reflect
openness.39 Thereafter, we present the results of a two-stage-least-squares estimation of the
random effects model using one period lags of the variables growth, openness, and distance
to the frontier as instruments for their non-lagged counterparts.
Table 5 shows the results of the regressions conducted in Sect. 8 but with the sum of
foreign direct investment in- and outflows as a measure of openness. The coefficients possess
the same signs as in the regressions presented in Sect. 8 and as expected from the theory. The
interaction between openness and growth plays an important role as shown in columns (2)
and (3) of Table 5, which display the estimation results of the fixed effects and the random
effects model with the interaction term between openness and growth. In both cases the
coefficient of the interaction term is significant at the 5 %-level, with a p value in the random
effects model slightly higher than 0.01 at 0.017. However, when only using FDI as openness
measure, we observe in the first column that openness is also significant in the fixed effects
regression model without the interaction term between openness and growth.
Again a Hausman-test does not reject that differences between the coefficients in the fixed
effects and the random effects model are statistically significant. Consequently, we can use
the random-effects model and include the time-invariant controls. The results are shown in
columns (4) and (5). In this case, openness is not significant when the interaction term is
left out (see col. (4)). Both the coefficient of the interaction term β3 and that of openness β2
become jointly significant at the 10 % level when the interaction term is added. The p values
of β2 and β3 are 0.069 and 0.087, respectively, and joint significance is at a p value of 0.089.
Next we present the two-stage least squares estimation results of the random effects model
with one-period lags as instruments for the variables growth, openness, and distance to the
technological frontier. The first stage results are depicted in the Table 6.
Joint significance of log growtht−1, log opennesst−1, log opennesst−1*log growtht−1 and
log frontiert−1 in all four reduced from regressions is given in F tests with p < 0.01. Addi-
tionally, the Kleibergen-Paap LM test of the rank of the matrix rejects H0: Rank of matrix is
39 We use the sum of net FDI inflows and net FDI outflows. The inflows are defined as follows: “Foreign
direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 % or more of
voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity
capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of
payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy
from foreign investors. Data in percentage of GDP” (World Bank 2010). The outflows are defined accordingly.
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Table 5 Estimation results when openness is reflected by FDI
Log basic research expenditures/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE RE RE RE
Log growth 0.034 0.127** 0.134** –0.011 0.080
(0.043) (0.058) (0.059) (0.044) (0.073)
Log openness (FDI) 0.073*** 0.146*** 0.149*** 0.014 0.073*
(0.023) (0.036) (0.035) (0.057) (0.040)
Log openness (FDI) * log growth –0.095** –0.104** –0.086*
(0.042) (0.044) (0.050)
Log distance to frontier 0.293 0.408* 0.464*** 0.326* 0.333*
(0.231) (0.222) (0.110) (0.192) (0.200)
Share of population –0.003 0.004 0.014 0.004 0.005
w. tertiary education (0.014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
Time-invar. controls No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.539 0.575 0.392 0.691 0.699
N 81 81 81 69 69
Notes: In all regressions we controlled for time trends and periodic effects via time dummies. Controlling
only for either of the two does not affect the results substantially. Standard error estimates are cluster robust
(cluster is country) and reported in parentheses
*** Significant at the 1 % level
** Significant at the 5 % level
* Significant at the 10 % level
Table 6 First-stage results
Log growth Log openness Log openness * log growth Log frontier
Log growtht−1 6.408 0.487** 25.573 –0.057
(4.490) (0.236) (19.288) (1.261)
Log opennesst−1 1.549* 0.909*** 6.944* –0.038
(0.870) (0.082) (3.628) (0.293)
Log opennesst−1 * log growtht−1 –1.642 -0.120** –6.589 0.019
(1.079) (0.057) (4.640) (0.301)
Log distance to frontiert−1 –0.498*** –0.037*** –2.112*** 0.876***
(0.166) (0.012) (0.714) (0.047)
Pop with tert educ 0.023 –0.003 0.106 –0.008
(0.035) (0.004) (0.154) (0.006)
Time invariant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 48 48 48 48
Notes: Random effects model is used in all four regressions. In all regressions we controlled for time trends
and periodic effects via time dummies. Standard error estimates are cluster robust (cluster is country) and
reported in parentheses
*** Significant at the 1 % level
** Significant at the 5 % level
* Significant at the 10 % level
123
J Econ Growth (2013) 18:33–68 67
Table 7 Second-stage results
Log basic research expenditures/GDP
Log growth 3.693
(0.196)
Log openness 2.305
(0.137)
Log openness * log growth –0.860
(0.203)
Log distance to frontier 0.083
(0.945)
Pop tert. education 0.003
(0.866)
Time-invariant controls Yes
Time dummies Yes
N 48
Notes: Random effects model with one period lagged instruments for log growth, log openness, log openness*
log growth, and log frontier. The p values are reported in parentheses
3 (lower than full rank = 4) at p value of 0.022.40 This indicates that our instruments have
explanatory power across all reduced forms.
Table 7 gives the second-stage results.
In Table 7, we present the p values in parentheses. As already discussed in the main text,
the signs of β2 and β3 are in line with our theoretical predictions, but the p values are at 0.2
for the interaction term of openness and growth and slightly lower for openness.
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